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JURISDICTION
A statement of this court's jurisdiction is set forth
at page one of appellant's brief and is not contested by appellee
Darin G. Woolstenhulme.

ISSUES PRESENT FOR REVIEW
1.

In light of the standard set forth by the Utah

Supreme Court in Mitchell

v.

Pearson

Enterprises,

697 P.2d 240,

246 (Utah 1985), did Clark, as the party opposing summary
judgment, meet his evidentiary burden to show that
Woolstenhulme's conduct was a substantial causative factor of
Clark's injuries?

STANDARD OP REVIEW
This court should:

"review a trial court's grant of

summary judgment under a 'correctness' standard,
omitted.)11

Kitchen

v.

(Utah App. 1991), cert.

Cal Gas Company,

den.

Inc.,

(Citations

821 P.2d 458, 460

832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, ETC.
Woolstenhulme submits that the interpretation of
constitutional provisions, etc., is not determinative of the
simple, narrow issue presented by Clark's appeal.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was injured
by the negligence of one or more of the defendants when, as a
pedestrian, he:

"was struck by one of the defendants' vehicles,

or a combination of defendants' vehicles•"

(R. 13, 14, f 25 of

plaintiff's Complaint.)

Course of Proceedings
After the parties exchanged written discovery (R. 64,
151, 152, 153, 154, 159, 196, 202, 263, 265, and 465.) and took
the depositions of each of the defendants, other witnesses, the
plaintiff, and plaintiff's experts (R. 432, 435, 612, 635, 176,
188, 438, 451, 300, 415, 494), all defendants, including
Woolstenhulme, moved for summary judgment.

(R. 539)

Each of the

defendants moving for summary judgment conceded for purposes of
the motion that they were negligent, but asserted that no jury,
absent rank speculation, could determine that such negligence
proximately caused Clark's injuries.

(See, e.g., R. 539; R. 677,

Woolstenhulme Addendum 000001-40.l)
1

Following the text of this brief and attached hereto is
Woolstenhulme's Addendum (W. Add.). All pages of the Addendum are
consecutively numbered at the lower right hand corner of the page.
2

Disposition in the Court Below
Woolstenhulme was granted summary judgment on April 29,
1993 because, as stated by the trial court:

"Any finding as to

proximate cause would be the result of speculation.

This case,

under plaintiff's present theories, would not only be problematic
for a jury, it would require jurors to engage in rank speculation
to reach a verdict,"

(R. 675; W. Add. 000003.)

Statement of Facts
On the evening of December 10, 1989, Darin
Woolstenhulme was driving up the on-ramp of 1-15 at the
interchange with Highway 89 on his way home.
depo. p. 11 lines 13-17; W. Add. 000007.)
lanes.

(Woolstenhulme

The on-ramp had two

When Mr. Woolstenhulme crested a hill, travelling in the

right lane, he saw a small foreign car stopped in the right lane
blocking his path.
around the car.
000007.)

He tried to get in the left lane to get

(Woolstenhulme depo. p. 11 lines 21-25; W. Add.

As Mr. Woolstenhulme moved to the left, he struck Brad

Gilbert, the owner of the small foreign car, who was at that time
standing in the roadway approximately on top of the white-line
separating the right and left hand lanes.

(Woolstenhulme depo.

p. 12 lines 1-7, p. 36 lines 1-25, p. 37 lines 1-10; W. Add.
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000008, 000011, 000012; Brad Gilbert depo. p. 26 lines 5-17; W.
Add. 000019.)
Mr. Woolstenhulme began pumping his brakes trying to
slow down because additional vehicles were stopped blocking the
left hand lane, having already been involved in prior collisions.
After slowing down, Mr. Woolstenhulme struck the rear end of a
white station wagon stopped in the left lane.

As a result of the

impact, Mr. Woolstenhulme's vehicle spun sideways and stopped on
the roadway.

(Woolstenhulme depo. p. 12 lines 13-25, p. 13 lines

1-7; W. Add. 000008-9.)

Mr. Woolstenhulme was then struck from

the rear by yet another vehicle.

Woolstenhulme drew a diagram

reflecting his understanding of the position of the various
vehicles and such diagram was attached to his deposition as
Exhibit 1.

That diagram is attached hereto at Woolstenhulme

Addendum 000017.

At the time of the accident Mr. Woolstenhulme

was driving a 1989 blue Chevrolet short bed pick-up truck.
(Woolstenhulme depo. p. 14 lines 24-25; W. Add. 000010.)
As Mr. Woolstenhulme was sitting in his truck waiting
for the dust to settle, other collisions occurred.

Specifically,

a large four door vehicle (driven by defendant Colovich) struck a
Jeep Cherokee (driven by defendant Hopkins) which had come to a
stop near the accident scene.

That collision pushed the Jeep

Cherokee into a vehicle driven by defendant MacArthur (which had

4

spun out and impacted the guard rail) and in which Clark had been
riding as a backseat passenger.

(Woolstenhulme depo. at p. 43

lines 17-25, p. 44 lines 1-25, p. 45 lines 1-10; W. Add. 00001315.)

Thereafter numerous other collisions occurred, but

Woolstenhulme was not really sure who hit whom.

(Woolstenhulme

depo. p. 45 lines 11-25, p. 46 lines 1-25; W. Add. 000015-16.)
Afterward, Bradley Clark was discovered lying on the other side
of the guard rail, down an embankment.
No one saw how Bradley Clark was injured.
(Woolstenhulme depo. at p. 33 lines 2-4; W. Add. 000010A.)
Bradley Clark does not know how he was injured.

(Clark

depo. p. 61 lines 18-25; W. Add. 000021.)
After the accident while Bradley Clark was laying in
the ambulance next to Jennifer MacArthur, MacArthur related how
she thought the accident occurred.

As told by Bradley Clark,

this is what she said:
We were sitting in there and I said, "What
happened?" She said, "Well, I think you got
out of the car and got hit by my car."
That's basically what she said. Now, that's
all that I can be sure that I heard.
(Clark depo. p. 62 lines 21-24; W. Add. 000022.)
Complaint on April 7, 1991.

Clark filed his

No allegation of exactly which

defendant's vehicle struck Clark, or how Clark was injured is
contained in the Complaint.

(R. 9)
5

After some preliminary

discovery, Hopkins filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 227)

In response to Hopkins' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Clark submitted an affidavit from Mr. Greg Duval dated February
10, 1992.

Mr. Duval, an accident reconstructionist, was hired by

Mr. Clark to figure out what happened in the accident.

At

paragraph 16 of Mr. Duval's affidavit Duval stated under oath:
16. It is my opinion that there are limited number of
ways in which Brad Clark could have been injured in
this accident. One of the most likely possibilities,
to be established through further discovery, is that
Brad Clark was struck by the MacArthur vehicle after
MacArthur was struck head on by Hopkins.
(R. 251; W. Add. 000023/ 000026.)

Thus Duval's affidavit

identified Hopkins as a likely cause of Clark's injuries.
After Hopkins' motion was denied, Duval was deposed.
The deposition occurred over the course of two days, October 19,
and October 23, and the transcript of the deposition is 159 pages
long.

Near the end of that deposition Mr. Duval was specifically

asked if, without guessing or speculating, he could describe the
mechanism or time of injury to Mr. Clark.

He responded:

"No.11

The exact exchange is reprinted below:
Q.

Mr. Duval, without guessing or speculating, would
you be able to tell me what the mechanism of
injury was to Mr. Clark?

A.

No.

Q.

Without guessing or speculating, would you be able
to tell me the sequence and time at which he
sustained an injury?
6

A.

No.

Q.

And I guess it's a fair statement, is it not, sir,
that there's no further work that you could do
which would enable you to answer that question?

A.

I don't think there is.

(Duval depo. p. 156 lines 14-25, p. 157 lines 1-4; W. Add.
000032-33.)
Earlier in the same deposition Mr. Duval was
specifically asked by counsel for Mr. Woolstenhulme if he could
describe when Clark was hit.

Mr. Duval responded that Clark was

hit on one of two occasions and that his "primary guess" was that
Clark was hit as a result of a chain reaction initiated by the
Woolstenhulme vehicle, or that the other possibility was that
Clark was hit when the MacArthur vehicle was struck first by the
Hopkins' vehicle.

The exact exchange is reprinted below:

Q.

When was he [Clark] hit?

A.

One of two times. One of two impacts. I would
say my primary
guess is, is that he exited the
vehicle prior to the time that Woolstenhulme hit
the MacArthur vehicle. He had already opened the
door and stepped out. It's either
the impact of
the Woolstenhulme truck into the MacArthur
vehicle, either
the MacArthur vehicle struck h i m —
if he was standing behind it and was knocked
backwards, if there's some angular i s s u e — o r that
the Woolstenhulme truck could have hit him as he
was outside of the door, or he could be further
back. He doesn't know. But that would be the
impact of most significant force to the MacArthur
vehicle was the one with the truck.
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And then the other possibility
is that the Jeep of
Hopkins could have pushed the car back further
after the Woolstenhulme impact.
My primary
guess is the Woolstenhulme impact
caused Brad to get hit by either
MacArthur's
vehicle or Woolstenhulme7s truck. (Emphasis
added.)
(Duval depo. p. 58 lines 21-25, p. 59 lines 1-18; W. Add. 00003031.)
On the day Duval's deposition concluded, Clark settled
with defendant Hopkins.

(R. 456)

Thereafter, in response to the Motion for Summary
Judgment of Woolstenhulme and others yet another affidavit of
Greg Duval, this one dated April 12, 1993 was submitted to the
court.

This time, after acknowledging that he was not able to

determine the exact mechanism of injury, Mr. Duval indicated that
the most probable mechanism of injury was "the sequence of
crashes caused by the Woolstenhulme truck."
state that:

Mr. Duval goes on to

"The second most likely probability consists of the

crash sequence caused by the Colovich automobile."
Add. 000034-35.)

(R. 631;

W.

No mention is made in Duval's second affidavit

of the Hopkins' vehicle (Hopkins had by that time settled with
the plaintiff) and no explanation is provided in the affidavit as
to the change in expert Duval's testimony from his first
affidavit and deposition testimony to his latest affidavit.
631; W. Add. 000034-37.)
8

(R.

Plaintiff's other expert, David Stephens had a
different guess as to what happened.

He testified in his

deposition taken on December 21, 1992, that although he was not
really sure which car hit Brad Clark, it could not have been the
Woolstenhulme vehicle in any event.

Relevant testimony is

reprinted below:
A.

And when you think about it, if Clark
had been hit first by the Buick before
the Buick hit the Cherokee, than it's
likely that he would have been pushed
into the Cherokee and perhaps even
crushed — between the Buick and the
Cherokee. So that would make it more
probable that it was the Cherokee that
hit him. But even that is not a solid
conclusion.
It's based on the highest
probability from the information that's
available.

I don't think it could have been Woolstenhulme
because he was too far out in the road. It would
have required a much greater angle of impact for
him to have bumped Clark and caused Clark to fly
over the guardrail. Because, as I said earlier, a
vehicle travelling in one direction has a very
difficult time hitting something and knocking it
in any direction but the direction the vehicle is
travelling.
Q.

Okay. So you think it is more likely that it is
either Adamson (sic) in the Jeep or Colovich in
the Buick; is that right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But as you sit here today, you don't know which;
is that right?
9

A.

I'd say the higher probability is the Jeep, but

I'm not

certain.

I can't

say for

sure.

(Emphasis

added,)
(Stephens depo. p. 37 lines 25, p. 38 lines 1-25, p. 39 lines 17; W. Add. 000039-40.)
Thus, in summary, although neither of plaintiff's
experts ever offered a solid expert opinion as to what happened
in this accident, plaintiff's expert Greg Duval first testified
in his affidavit that his best guess was that the accident was
caused by the Hopkins' vehicle; then in his deposition changed
his mind and decided his "primary guess11 was that the
Woolstenhulme vehicle did it, or if that is not what happened
then it was probably the Hopkins' vehicle; and then in his next
affidavit decided that his best guess was that probably the
Woolstenhulme vehicle was the cause or maybe, and for the first
time, it was the Colovich vehicle.

On the other hand,

plaintiff's other expert David Stephens, who also could not say
for sure which vehicle struck Clark, speculated that it was
either Hopkins or Colovich, but not Woolstenhulme,

(Duval's

first affidavit, W. Add. 000023-28; Duval depo. p. 58 lines 2125, p. 59 lines 1-18, W. Add. 000030-31; Duval second affidavit,
W. Add. 000034-37; Stephens depo. p. 37 line 25, p. 38 lines 125, p. 39 lines 1-7, W. Add. 000039-40.)
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After two years of litigation, over one thousand pages
of deposition transcripts, two accident reconstructionists,
written discovery and investigation, plaintiff was not able to
submit to the court a single shred of direct evidence
establishing that plaintiff Clark was even hit by a vehicle in
the accident, let alone that his injuries (which may have been
caused by diving over the guardrail) were proximately caused by
the negligence, if any, of Darin Woolstenhulme.

(R. 631)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In order to defeat Woolstenhulme's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Clark was required to come forward with credible,
admissible evidence to establish:

"a direct causal connection

between [Woolstenhulme's] alleged negligence and the injury."
Mitchell

v.

Pearson

Enterprises,

697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985).

Plaintiff was obligated to come forward with evidence (not just
allegations) that would have allowed the jury to reach a
conclusion as to the potential causal connection between
Woolstenhulme's alleged negligence and Clark's injury without
engaging in speculation.

For "when the proximate cause of an

injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of
law."

Staheli

v. Farmers

Cooperative

11

of Southern

Utah,

655 P.2d

680, 684 (Utah 1982), as set forth in Mitchell,

697 P.2d at 246.

Clark failed to present such evidence to the trial court.
To defeat summary judgment, Clark relied entirely on an
affidavit from Greg Duval submitted with Clark's Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment.
of causation was submitted.

No other evidence on the issue

The affidavit of Duval (aside from

failing to establish the requisite causal connection because it
speaks only in terms of probabilities without quantifying those
probabilities) should be ignored by this court just as it was
ignored by the trial court because it conflicts, without any
explanation offered in the affidavit, with both an earlier
affidavit of Duval and his deposition testimony.

In Utah, when

testimony is presented in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment which conflicts with prior testimony, unless the
subsequent testimony includes an adequate explanation for the
discrepancy, the subsequent testimony should be ignored.
v.

Sill,

Webster

675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983).
Additionally, Clark's expert's "primary guess" is not

admissible expert testimony and therefore, could not be relied
upon by Clark to defeat summary judgment.

Norton

v.

Blackham,

669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (affidavit must set forth
admissible testimony to be considered); Highland
Company

v.

Union

Pacific

Railroad

Company,
12

Construction

683 P.2d 1042, 1051

(Utah 1984) (a logical nexus between an expert's opinion and the
facts must be established).
The unexplained conflicting guesses of Clark's expert
would leave the jury in this case with nothing upon which to base
a conclusion as to proximate cause except speculation based upon
speculation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CLARK FAILED TO PRESENT ADEQUATE EVIDENCE
TO THE TRIAL COURT TO ESTABLISH THAT
A JURY COULD RESOLVE THE ISSUE OP
PROXIMATE CAUSE ABSENT SPECULATION
What Clark was Required to Submit to the Trial Court:
While, as Clark has pointed out in his brief, summary
judgment is generally improper on the issue of causation, in
appropriate circumstances, summary judgment may be granted on the

issue of proximate cause. Jensen
and Telegraph

Company,

v. Mountain

States

611 P.2d 363, 365 (Utah 1980).

Telephone
Utah

courts have not been reluctant to grant summary judgment, and to
uphold the grant of summary judgment, in proper cases involving
negligence.

See, Dwiggins

(Utah 1991); Mitchell,

v. Morgan Jewelers,

811 P.2d 182, 183

697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985); Preston

436 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1968); Kitchen
P.2d 458, 460-61 (Utah App. 1991).

13

v.

v.

Cal Gas Company,

Lamb,
821

In this case, in order to withstand defendant
Woolstenhulme's Motion for Summary Judgment, Clark was required
to come forward with evidence that established a direct causal
connection between Woolstenhulme's negligence and Clark's alleged
injury.

Mitchell,

697 P.2d at 245.

Clark must have submitted

some direct evidence on the issue of causation in order for the
jury to resolve that issue absent speculation.

Without such

direct evidence (recognizing that the evidence need not be
ultimately persuasive, but only adequate to provide the jury a
rational foundation upon which to base an opinion), Clark's claim
fails as a matter of law.

Id.

at 246.

Even though inferences

must be resolved in Clark's favor, Clark cannot now, and could
not before the trial court rely on naked assertions, unsupported
by facts, to establish a prima facie case (which includes
Kitchen,

proximate cause) against Woolstenhulme.
461.

821 P.2d at

Furthermore, Clark could not rely on an affidavit which set

forth testimony in conflict with earlier sworn testimony unless
an acceptable explanation for the conflict was provided.
v.

Sill,

675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983).

Webster

If the evidence

submitted by Clark to defeat summary judgment conflicts with
earlier sworn testimony and no explanation is provided, the
subsequent testimony must be ignored.

14

Id.

at 1173.

Clark cannot rely on Duval's April 12, 1993 affidavit
testimony which conflicts with both his February 10, 1992
affidavit and his October 19 and 23, 1992 deposition because no
explanation is offered in the subsequent affidavit which resolves
the conflicts.

Clark cannot submit the testimony of his expert,

Duval, to the effect that the accident was caused most probably
by defendant Hopkins, when trying to defeat Hopkins' Motion for
Summary Judgment and then, after settling with Hopkins, submit
Duval's new and revised testimony to the effect that either
Woolstenhulme or Colovich caused the accident when trying to
defeat Woolstenhulme and Colovich's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court, probably in recognition of the sometimes
rather mercurial nature of the opinions of experts, has held that
subsequent testimony which conflicts with prior testimony cannot
be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment absent a sound
explanation for the discrepancy.

Webster

v.

Sill,

675 P.2d at

1173.

What Clark Actually Submitted to the Trial Court;
The only evidence, direct or otherwise, submitted by
Clark on the issue of causal connection between Woolstenhulme's
conduct and Clark's injuries was the affidavit of Greg Duval
signed April 12, 1993.

(W. Add. 000034-37.)
15

That affidavit sets

forth no new facts and sets forth no explanation as to why
Duval's opinion has changed from his first affidavit; when he
testified under oath that the Hopkins vehicle was the most likely
cause of the accident (W. Add. 000026.)/ or when he testified in
his deposition that he did not know the mechanism of injury but
that his best guess was either the Woolstenhulme vehicle or the
Hopkins vehicle.

(W. Add. 000030-31.)

Quite understandably Clark did not submit to the trial
court (although defendant Woolstenhulme did) the alleged opinions
of the other expert hired by Clark, David Stephens, who testified
that although he could not tell for sure what caused the accident
(maybe it was Colovich, maybe it was Hopkins), it was not
Woolstenhulme.

(W. Add. 000039-40.)

Why Clark's Evidence was Inadequate:
First, even if this court decides to consider Duval's
April 12, 1993 affidavit, along with Duval's deposition and his
first affidavit, and along with Stephens' conflicting testimony,
Woolstenhulme submits that if all such evidence were presented to
a jury, that jury would be hopelessly confused and could not,
absent speculation, resolve the issue of who, if anyone's,
negligence caused Clark's injury.

No evidence was submitted as

to how or where or which car, or when in the sequence of events,
16

Clark was struck, if he was struck at all.
v.

Pearson

Enterprises,

supra,

Just as in

Mitchell

it is plaintiff's failure to

present evidence of a link between Woolstenhulme's negligence
(which was never precisely identified) and Clark's injuries which
justifies summary judgment for Woolstenhulme.
One of Clark's experts testified that it was not
Woolstenhulme that struck Clark and the other expert first
testified that it was Hopkins that most probably struck Clark,
then testified that he did not know the mechanism of injury but
that his "best guess" was that it was probably Woolstenhulme, but
maybe Hopkins, and then in a later affidavit testified that it
was probably Woolstenhulme but maybe Colovich.
28, 30-31, 34-37.)

Just as in Mitchell

(W. Add. 000023-

there were no eye

witnesses with knowledge pertinent to the issue of causation and
just as in Mitchell

experts' hypotheses of several alternative

series of events, some which might implicate defendant and some
which would not, were inadequate to overcome defendant's motion
for summary judgment.

Mitchell,

697 P.2d at 246.

(In

Mitchell,

plaintiff submitted to the Court the fact that there were no
signs of forced entry into Mitchell's room and then argued that
it must be inadequate security which allowed a murderer to enter
Mitchell's hotel room and kill him.

The Utah Supreme Court

responded, that such evidence could also be indicative of entry
17

by a friend or colleague of Mitchell's and in any event such
conclusions were not supported by direct evidence.

Id.)

Woolstenhulme is not suggesting that Clark is
prohibited from presenting alternative theories to the jury.
Clark may present alternative theories to the jury, but each of
his theories must be supported by something more than the
unsubstantiated conflicting guesses which were submitted in this
case.
Second, the Court should ignore the April 12, 1993
affidavit of Duval upon which Clark relies to defeat summary
judgment (and as authority for many of the factual assertions in
his brief), because Duval's unsupported opinion set forth therein
conflicts, without any explanation, with Duval's earlier
affidavit and with his deposition testimony.

In his first

affidavit, Duval swears that it was most probably the Hopkins
Jeep that caused the accident; then in his October 1992
deposition, he testified that he did not know, absent guessing or
speculating, what the mechanism of injury was, but that it was
probably either Woolstenhulme or Hopkins; then, in his April 12,
1993 affidavit Duval swears that the accident was most probably
caused by Woolstenhulme and the next most likely cause was
Colovich.

(W. Add. 000023-28, 30-31, 34-37.)

No explanation is

offered in the final affidavit for the discrepancies in
18

testimony.
supra,

As such, the affidavit should be ignored.

675 P.2d at 1173.

Webster,

Without the final Duval affidavit, no

evidence remains to establish the requisite causal link.
Third, both Duval and Stephens testified that they did
not know what caused Clark's injuries.

Duval was asked in his

deposition the following clear, concise question:
Q.

Mr. Duval, without guessing or speculating,
would you be able to tell me what the
mechanism of injury was to Mr. Clark?

A.

No.

Q.

Without guessing or speculating, would you be
able to tell me the sequence and time at
which he sustained an injury?

A.

No.

(Duval depo. p. 156 lines 14-25; W. Add. 000032.)

Likewise, when

expert Stephens was asked who hit Clark, he was unable to choose
between Adamson (sic) in the Jeep or Colovich in the Buick.

He

testified as follows:
Q.

Okay. So you think it is more likely that it
is either Adamson in the Jeep or Colovich in
the Buick; is that right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But as you sit here today, you don't know
which; is that right?

A.

I'd say the higher probability is the Jeep,
but I'm not certain. I can't say for sure.
19

(Stephens depo. p. 38 line 25, p. 39 lines 1-7; W. Add. 00003940.)
Such expert testimony is worthless as evidence.

It is

no more than the unsubstantiated speculation of two accident
reconstructionists who simply do not know what happened.

The

logical nexus between the experts' testimony and the facts has
not be established; the basis in terms of facts or data of the
expert testimony has not been provided.

Both are required.

Guesses and speculation are not evidence.
Company

v.

Union

Pacific

Railroad,

Highland

Construction

683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah

1984) . The trial court properly concluded that this case:
"Would not only be problematic for a jury, it would require
jurors to engage in rank speculation to reach a verdict."

(R.

677; W. Add. 000003.)
CONCLUSION
Woolstenhulme respectfully requests this court to
affirm the trial court's ruling which granted summary judgment to
Woolstenhulme.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT<<3j_ | '
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED RULING ON
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

Case No. 910400220

FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, et al.,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Farmer's Insurance Exchange, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, MacArthur, Colovich, Hopkins, Gilbert and Woostenhulm. On April 15, 1993,
the Court heard oral argument on the motions. The Court, having duly considered the
arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following:
RULING
A motion for summary judgment may only be granted when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.Pro
56. In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to support a finding of (1) a duty to plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a causal
link between the negligent conduct of the defendant and the injury suffered by plaintiff, and
(4) damages. The issue before the Court is, given the facts as alleged by plaintiff, whether

000001

plaintiffs allegations can support a finding of proximate causation as to each defendant. For
the purpose of summary judgment only, the Court will assume without deciding that plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part of the defendants.
Proximate causation can be defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause — the one that necessarily
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." Mitchell at 245-46. Additionally,
plaintiff bears the burden to show initially that the defendants conduct was a "substantial
causative factor" leading to plaintiffs injury. Mitchell at 246.
This case can be compared to the facts in Mitchell. In Mitchell, plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action after Mr. Mitchell was found dead in his hotel room. Plaintiffs were
successful in alleging facts sufficient to establish negligent conduct but the court determined
that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any direct evidence linking Mitchell's death and the
alleged negligent conduct. The court found that since there was an absence of direct
evidence on causation, the jury would be left to speculation. Mitchell at 246. The court
stated that "[w]hen proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a
matter of law." Id.; Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 (Utah
1982).
While it is true that the issue of proximate cause is generally considered a question of
fact, the court may take the question away from the factfinder when appropriate.

Mitchell
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v. Pearson Enterprises. 687 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). See also Steffensen v. Smith's
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 1991). If reasonable inferences can be
drawn from the evidence, then the matter should be put to the factfinder. Steffensen. at 486.
But in the absence of proof on the issue of causation, there is no evidence upon which a jury
could make reasonable inferences and hence the jury would be left to speculate on the issue
of causation.
After considering the arguments and extensive briefs presented by counsel, the Court
determines that as to defendants Farmer's Insurance, State Farm Insurance, Mac Arthur,
Colovich, Hopkin, and Woolstenhulme no direct evidence exists on the issue of causation as
to these defendants. In fact, plaintiffs own expert, Mr. Duvall, was asked in his deposition
whether he would be able to determine the mechanism of plaintiffs injury without
speculating or guessing. His response was "no."
This Court has been unable to determine from the arguments presented any exact
mechanism for plaintiffs injury. The Court finds that any finding as to proximate cause
would be the result of speculation. This case, under plaintiffs present theories, would not
only be problematic for a jury, it would require jurors to engage in rank speculation to reach
a verdict. That result would not be fair, nor just, nor appropriate for any of the parties.
Accordingly, the Court grants these defendants 's Motions for Summary Judgment. The
Court denies defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Dated at Provo, this^Z day of

,Sr/?^r

3

^»

1993

-

ooouos

BY THE COURT

^t&tge Lynn W. Davis
cc:

James G. Clark, Esq.
Richard K. Spratley, Esq.
Robert L. Jeffs, Esq.
Michael P. Zaccheo, Esq.
Aaron Alma Nelson, Esq.
Paul M. Belnap, Esq.
D. Richard Smith, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UT
BRADLEY CLARK
Plaintiff,
v.

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 910400220
Judge Lynn W. Davis

FARMER'S INSURANCE, et. al.,
Defendants.

The Court has recently entered a ruling in the the above case. The Court has granted
summary judgment to all the defendants, except defendant Gilbert. The Court inadvertently
failed to include defendant Woolstenhulme motion for summary judgment as being included
in the granting of summary judgment. The Court will include an Amended Ruling on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment which includes the granting of summary
judgment to defendant Woolstenhulme.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF

BRADLEY

M.

COURT,

UTAH

CLARK,

Plaintiff,
910400220

vs .
FARMERS INSURANCE
et a l . ,

EXCHANGE,

Defendants.

DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
DARIN W O O L S T E N H U L M E

TAKEN

R i c h a r d s , Brandt, Miller & N e l s o n ,
50 South Main Street, Suite 7 0 0 ,
Salt Lake City, Utah

AT

October

DATE:
REPORTED

OF

BY

22,

1992

Lesley N e l s o n ,

CSR

CENTER COURT REPORTING
203 Kress Building
40 South 100 West
Provo, Utah
84601
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 373-4646
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1

Q

(BY MR. CLARK)

Tell me--

We're

2

discussing an accident that happened about-- I

3

believe December 10, 1989, in which my client,

4

Bradley Clark was injured.

5
6
7

If you would, please, tell me, in your
words, how you happened to be involved in this.
A

MR. ZACCHEO:

8
9
10
11

Meaning what?
You want to know where

he was going or what happened in the accident?
Q

(BY MR. CLARK)

What happened in the

accident?

12

A

I wasn't sure what you wanted.

13

I just left my girlfriend's house at the

14

time, was heading home.

15

complete stop at a red stop light before heading

16

up the on-ramp or the access road that connects

17

U.S. 89 to 1-15.

18

I had been at a

As I come up over the top-- it's a rounded

19

type of road on top of it.

20

right-hand lane.

21

I was in the

And as soon as I got on top where I could

22

actually see down the other side, there was the

23

small foreign car in the same lane at a dead

24

stop. I immediately tried to get in the left

25

lane to get around the car.

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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11

As I moved into the left lane, started to

2

go past the car, there was an individual

3

standing probably right on top of the white

4

line.

5

the car that was stalled in the lane. Tried to

6

get around him.

7

so.

81

Probably-- I don't know.

Real close to

Didn't have enough time to do

My truck struck this individual.

He went

9

up over the right-hand side of my truck, rolled

10

off the hood, over the windshield and somewhere

11

over behind me. I have no idea where. Just over

12

the right side.

13

At that time I was trying to get back

14

around the car in the right lane.

15

There was more cars in the left lane, but

16

stalled, stopped. Was pumping my brakes trying

17

to slow down and struck the rear end of a white

18

station wagon.

191
20
21

Q

Looked up.

What part of your car made contact with

what part of the white station wagon?
A

Basically the front end of my truck

22

struck the rear end of the station wagon

23

tailgate.

24
25

Q

At some point your car, as I understand

it, became sideways on the road.

Was that

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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1
2

subsequent to the collision?
A

As far as I know, yeah. I was pretty

3

much headed south when I struck the vehicle.

4

But in the process of striking it--the force--I

5

don't-- You know, I don't really know.

6
7
8
9
10

When it came to a rest, I was facing more
of an easterly direction.
Q

The damage to your car, was that pretty

much across the front of the grill?
A

I had damage across the front of my

11

grill and down both sides of my vehicle in the

12

total cab area.

13

untouched.

14

Q

15
16
17

The bed of the truck was

Mr. Woolstenhulme, when did you first

become aware that a crash was going to happen?
A

Basically as soon as I saw the first

car in the right-hand lane.

18

Q

And you managed to avoid that car,

19

didn't you?

20

A

21

As I missed that car--and like I said,

I did.

But there had been--

22

there was two cars in front of me that already

23

had hit eachother.

24

occurred at that point.

25

Q

So the accident had already

Okay.

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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And when you came upon the scene there were
basically three cars that were on the road?
A

Yes, there was.

Q

You mentioned that you stopped at a red

light prior to entering onto the on-ramp area.
Were there any cars in front of you at the
red light?
A

No.

I was the first car at the line.

There was a car lane-- left lane right next to
me .
Q

What kind of car was that?

A

It was a Jeep Cherokee.

Q

Do you recall any other cars at the

stop light?
A

There was cars behind me.

But other

than that, that's all I know.
Q

All of you stopped at the light?

A

Yes .

Q

So at least three cars that you were

aware of that were stopped at the light?

22
23
24
25

A

Yes.

Q

Describe your truck for me, if you

would, please.
A

It was a 1989 Chevrolet, extended cab,

four-wheel drive, short bed.

Blue on top and

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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33
A

Yes .

Q

Did you hear anybody saying anything

that would indicate how Brad was struck?
A

I did not,

Q

Was there anybody with you?

A

No.

Q

Were you injured in any way?

A

No, I was not.

Q

Any idea who notified the police?

A

I don't have any idea.

Q

I understand that you were a party to a

meeting with the police that took place several
days after the accident.
A

Yes .

Q

Can you tell me what you related to the

investigating police officer at that time?
A

Basically I-- It was a long time ago. I

just don't remember.
Q

Do you remember what anybody else said

about what happened?
A

I do not.

Just everybody kind of

discussed what they thought had happened.
Q

As you drove up the o n - r a m p —

after the

light turned green, or whatever, and you
proceeded up the on-ramp-- did you notice any

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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for sure.
Q

When you went over to the-- I guess you

call it the right-side of the guardrail-- the
westside of the guardrail-- to talk with the
person that you saw get off the road and go
across, did you talk with anybody else there?
That is, was he there alone, or was he with
other people?
A

As I walked that direction, he walked

up to me and basically made a comment that I had
struck him.

And I said, " Yeah, I did."

asked him if he was okay.
that I had hit someone.

And I

I was pretty shook up
He said, "Yeah, I'm

fine." And that was pretty much the
conversation.
Q

Did he indicate he actually saw your

vehicle strike him?
A

Again, as far as I recall, he said,

" You struck me."

" You hit me", I believe is

probably what he said.
Q

And he indicated at that time that he

was okay?
A

Said he was a little shook up.

One of his knees hurt.
which one.

I don't recall

That was about it.

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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Q

Are you aware of anybody who

witnessed-- who either actually witnessed or
claims to have witnessed the accident or the
collision between you and the pedestrian?
A

Just himself and myself, as far as I

Q

When you talked to-- I guess it was Mr.

know.

Gilbert-- did he indicate how your vehicle
struck him?
A

No.

He just said, " You struck me."

Q

What was the weather like as you were

driving towards the accident that evening?
A

As--

Q

I understand you had only been on the

road for three miles or so.

But what was the

weather like?
A

As I stated before, the road was wet.

The weather was cloudy, but nothing was falling
Q

Okay.

Did you have your windshield wipers on?
A

No .

Q

Picking up road spray from other

vehicles that you recall?
A

Not that I recall, no.

Q

Do you recall what time the collision

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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1

of the speed of your vehicle at the time it made

2

contact for the first time with another vehicle?

3|

A

Maybe half of what I was going, 20

4

miles-an-hour.. But I have no idea. It's a

5

guess.

6

Q

7

And again, the speed of your vehicle at

the time you made contact with the pedestrian?

81

A

Again, I'd have to guess. I don't know.

9

Q

Okay.

10
11

Slower than you were going when you hit the
car?

12

A

No.

13

Q

Did you witness any other collisions

14

I'd say probably a little faster.

that evening?

15

A

Sort of.

16

Q

Tell me what you saw.

17

A

Well, I witnessed the Sprint hit me. I

18

also witnessed-- I believe it was a big

19

four-door. I don't know what it was. I believe

20

it hit-- I think that was the car, I don't

21

know.

22

and pushed the Cherokee into the red car.

23

Some car hit the back end of the Cherokee

Q

Did you see the collision between the

24

sedan that hit the Cherokee-- I mean, between

25

the sedan and the Cherokee?

Did you see those

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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two cars collide?
A

I saw a car strike the back of the

Cherokee,

I think it was big four-door. It was

just, you know, quick.

But I saw the Cherokee

be pushed forward into the red car,
Q

Did it appear to be--

I'm sorry.

Did you see any other cars hit

the Cherokee?
A

Not to my recollection, no.

Q

How long after you came to a stop did

the Cherokee and this other vehicle collide?
A

Oh, I don't know. I couldn't give you a

timeframe.
could--

It was long enough that, you know, I

I was sitting there and I could see

what was where. Other than that, I don't know a
timeframe.
Q

Minutes or seconds?

A

It would have probably have been-- I'd

say at least a minute.
Q

And did you see any other vehicle hit

the Jeep?
A

I did not.

Q

What movement did the Jeep take as a

result of the contact with the car you
described?

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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1

A

It was a complete stop when I first saw

2

it. I looked out and could see people sitting in

3

the car. Whatever vehicle struck it pushed it

4

forward. South.

5

Q

How far south did it go?

6

A

I don't know the distance. I have no

7
81
9

idea.

Several feet.
Q

The Jeep then collided with the red

car, didn't it?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Did the Jeep hit anything else that

12
13
14

you're aware of?
A

I believe it slid down the guardrail.

But I don't know for sure.

15

Q

Did you witness any other collisions?

16

A

There was lots of collisions going on

17

after me.

I could look out my window and see

18

other cars kind of hitting.

19

hitting what, I have no idea.

But what was

20

Q

Tell me what you saw that you recall.

21

A

I remember some car, I believe, hit the

22

Datsun-- the original car that had been in the

23

right-hand

24
25

Q

lane.

Do you recall what part of that car hit

what part of the Datsun?

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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1

A

2

rear of it.

3

Q

Do you recall what car hit the Datsun?

41

A

I do not.

5

Q

Do you recall where both of those cars

6

I don't. I have no idea.
But that's a guess.

Maybe the
I don't know.

went after the collision between them?

7

A

I have no idea.

8

Q

Did the Datsun appear to move at all

9
10

after the collision?
A

It definitely slid south and probably

11

to the right.

12

how far or exactly where it came to rest.

13

Q

But other than that, I don't know

And the car that crashed into it, did

14

you see what happened to that vehicle after the

15

collision?

16

A

17

turned it.

18
19
20

Q

I believe it was facing east to have
But other than that, I don't know.

Do you remember at any time a vehicle

passing behind your car?
A

There was one vehicle that came through

21

and didn't hit anything, to my knowledge. To my

22

knowledge, I just remember-- I believe it was--

23

it seemed like it was one of those little

24

mini-van type of things.

25

of maneuvered through and didn't hit any cars

But it actually kind

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff,
910400220

vs .
FARMERS INSURANCE
et al. ,

EXCHANGE,

Defendants.

DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
MARCUS GILBERT

TAKEN AT:

OF:

Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson,
50 South Main Street, Suite 700,
Salt Lake City, Utah

DATE

October 19, 1992

REPORTED BY

Lesley Nelson, CSR

CENTER COURT REPORTING
203 Kress Building
40 South 100 West
Provo, Utah
84601
Telephone: (801) 373-4646
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1

kinda my standard attire at the time.

2

Q

3

collisions?

4

running into each other?

5

A

Do you remember seeing any actual
That is, any two vehicles

actually

I remember seeing-- it seemed to be a

6

little Sprint hitting the truck that hit me, the

7

Chevy.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

Four by four.

10

Q

And I'm sorry.

11

to ask you.

That's what I was going

12

Do you know what vehicle hit you?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Go ahead.

15

A

It was a Chevy pickup truck, a four by

16

four.

I believe it was a three-quarter ton

17

light blue, late 80's, early 90's.

18

MR. PETERSON:

19

MR. ZACCHEO:

20

Q

(BY MR. CLARK)

Close enough?
That's it.
And do you recall

21

where you were standing at the time you were

22

hit?

23

A

I don't recall exactly, no.

I was

24

fairly close to the car-- the hispanic lady I

25

was talking to. But I don't recall exactly where
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1

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

* * *

4

BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H.
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON
V. HOLBROOK, DONALD S.
COLOVICH, WILLIAM T. HOPKINS,
DAREN G. WOOLSTENHULME,
JENNIFER MacARTHUR, RITA M.
KENNEDY and/or U.S. FOREST
SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON, and
JOHN DOES 1 through 5,

Civil No. 910400220
Deposition of:
BRADLEY M. CLARK

Defendants.

13
14

* * *

15
16
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of October,

17
18

1991, the deposition of BRADLEY M. CLARK was taken before

19

Linda Van Tassell, a Certified Shorthand Reporter (License

20

No. 83), Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public

21

in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 11:00

22

a.m. of said day at the offices of Jeffs & Jeffs, 90 North

23

100 East, Provo City, Utah County, State of Utah.
* *

24
25

*

Reporter:

A

Linda Van Tassell

MERIT ^

O REPORTERS O

(801) 522-3742

5 DAy DELIVERY

185 South State Street • Suite 380 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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1

the last thing I remember.

2

Q

Can you describe this gentleman, how he looked?

3

A

I have no idea —

it was just like dark.

I see his car —

That's

4

all I can see.

it seems like I can see his

5

car over in the background and I just see him walking across

6

the road kind of like a silhouette type of thing.

7

Q

He was walking toward you?

8

A

Yeah.

9

Q

Do you have a clear recollection of him saying,

10
11
12
13
14
15

I'm sorry, I'm sorry.
A

Yeah.

My car was stalled on the road?

For some reason I definitely hear that he

says, I can't get it started or something.
Q

Is it your best guess that the reason you got out

of the car is to go help him?
A

Yeah, definitely.

That's definitely what I was

16

thinking is, this guy has got to get his car out of the road

17

or someone is really going to get hurt, and then that's it.

18
19

Q

You don't remember anything else at the scene of

the accident?

20

A

21

blacked out.

22

Q

23
24
25

I remember reaching for the door and then I

Do you remember anything else at the scene of the

accident?
A

I remember waking up on a stretcher and being put

in the ambulance.
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Q

Do you remember talking with anyone else at the

scene of the accident?

Any other conversation that you were

part of or heard?
A

Yeah.

I remember getting into the ambulance.

They put me in the ambulance and Jennifer was in there next
to me and her mouth was wired shut or something and I was
asking —

I was trying to joke to make her feel comfortable

about that, trying to relax what was going on.

I'm sure she

was pretty upset.

And I asked her what happened, because I

didn't even know.

I couldn't remember anything.

She said

something like I got out of the car and got hit by a car,
came down and hit her car and got hit by a car and flipped
over the guardrail, and that's all I can remember.
Q

Let's back up.

She gave you some explanation of

her version of what happened

—

A

Yeah.

Q

—

A

Yes.

Q

Can you slowly, so we make sure the court reporter

as you were in the ambulance.

gets it, give me, as best you recall, of what she said.
A
happened?

We were sitting in there and I said, What
She said, Well, I think you got out of the car and

got hit by my car.

That's basically what she said.

Now,

that's all that I can be sure that I heard.
Q

All right.
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JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637
Attorney for Plaintiff
96 East 100 South
Provo, UT 84606-4603
Telephone: (801) 375-6092
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF GREG DUVAL IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
HOPKINS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND/OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE

BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et.
al.
Defendants.

Civil No. 910400220
Judge: George E. Ballif

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Lt. Greg DuVal, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That I was retained by counsel for the Plaintiff as an

expert witness and as a forensic expert regarding the issues of
accident investigation and reconstruction in the multiple vehicle
automobile crash at issue in this action.
2.

That I am presently employed as a lieutenant with the

Provo City Police Department in Provo, Utah.
3.
DuVal

That since 1985 I have been President of my own company,
Investigations

and

Accident

Reconstruction,

a

private

0001)23

consulting business.
4.

That

Enforcement

I hold

and

a B.S. Degree

Justice

in Police Science, Law

Administration

from

Brigham

Young

University, receiving said degree in 1979.
5.

That I have received post-graduate education specifically

associated with accident reconstruction from Utah State Police
Officer's Standard and Training, Northwestern University Traffic
Institute.
member

I have engaged in extensive self study, and I am a

in

good

standing

of

the

Society

of

Accident

Reconstructionists's (SOAR).
6.

That in the course of my police work and my private

consulting business I have investigated thousands of automobile
accidents and recostructed hundreds of automobile accidents.
7.

That

I

have

qualified

as

an

expert

accident

reconstructionist on numerous occasions in District and Circuit
Courts for the State of Utah.
8.

I have certified and testified as an expert witness

before every division in the Fourth District Court.
9.

That as an expert in the areas of accident investigation

and reconstruction, I usually and ordinarily rely upon physical
evidence obtained at the scene of the accident, photographs of
damages to the vehicles, statements obtained from the witnesses,
personal

interviews, a review of affidavits, interrogatories,
2
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requests for production and depositions in cases.
10.

In this case I have done all of the above.

I have

visited the scene of the incident and I have taken photographs. I
have obtained photographs from the Utah Highway Patrol taken before
any cars were moved from the scene.

I have obtained and reviewed

the police investigative report and witnesses statements contained
therewith.

I have seen witness statements obtained by insurance

adjusters, reviewed the depositions taken in this case and I have
personally conducted interviews with Rita Kennedy, Brad Clark,
Daren Woolstenhulme,
Holbrook.

David Adamson,

Don Colovich,

and Gordon

All interviews were with parties to this case and are

foundational and constitute admissions by parties.
11.

Based upon my review of all the above materials in this

case, and particularly the investigative officer's report and
interviews with Adamson and Colovich, it is my opinion at this time
that the Hopkins vehicle never came to a stop prior to colliding
with the MacArthur vehicle in a head-on fashion.
12.

Based upon the statements of Adamson, Colovich, Hopkins,

the investigating police officer and particularly the photographs
taken by the Utah Highway Patrol before any of the vehicles had
been moved, Defendant Hopkins vehicle crashed in to MacArthur's
vehicle in a head-on fashion.
13.

Based upon the information I have available at this time,
3
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it is my opinion that the incident did not happen as provided in
Hopkins1

affidavit.

That

is inconsistent

with

the physical

evidence in this case and with the statements which have been
provided.
14.

The evidence provided by Hopkins and the Utah Highway

Patrol photographs indicate that Hopkins made contact with at least
three cars including MacArthur.
15.

Based upon my investigation and review of all materials

in this case, it is my opinion that Defendant Hopkins was one of
the prime players in this accident. There is insufficient evidence
at this time to rule out liability on Hopkins, and in fact there
appears to be some liability on him.
16.

It is my opinion that there are limited number of ways in

which Brad Clark could have been injured in this accident.

One of

the most likely possibilities, to be established through further
discovery, is that Brad Clark was struck by the MacArthur vehicle
after MacArthur was struck head-on by Hopkins.
17.

In my interview with Defendant Adamson he told me that

he was following Hopkins on the roadway, Hopkins began to break and
slide sideways and Defendant Adamson's vehicle made contact with
Hopkins1 vehicle.

As Adamson's vehicle spun around he saw the

Hopkins vehicle make head on contact with the MacArthur vehicle.
18.

It is my opinion that Hopkins1 attempt to stop in the
4
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middle of the freeway on-ramp may have been negligent and caused
the collision with MacArthur's car,
19.

Defendant Colovich told me in his interview that he

collided with the back of the Hopkins1 vehicle.

While this is

consistent with Hopkins1 claim that he was struck twice from
behind, it is inconsistent that the collision took place over an
approximate two minute period as Hopkins claims.
20.

Further, Rita Kennedy related in her interview that she

saw the semi and the MacArthur car approaching and jumped over the
guard rail.

Rita had been over the guard rail for a few seconds

when Brad Clark came flying over the guard rail landing nearby.
Approximately ten to fifteen seconds later two men came over the
guard rail to help Brad.

Daren Woolstenhulme said that was he and

Mr. Hopkins (from the jeep).
21.

I have not been able to interview Mr. Hopkins, he has not

provided a statement, photographs, or a deposition in this case.
In

the

absence

of

obtaining

information

from

Hopkins,

Woolstenhulme, Colovich, and Gilbert, I am unable to exclude
Defendant Hopkins either as a negligent party or as a cause of the
injury suffered by Brad Clark in this case.
For further affiant saith not.
DATED AND SIGNED this /C

day of February, 1992.

Lt. Greg—kuVal

5
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

\fi

day of February,

1992.

^
2&^£Z
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Utah County
My commission Expires:
,<'»-%>.
6%~Z<*?\
T f%SS£!* V \

i-il-%

'

*&$* *)
\ ^ t i i r J$I
*\ *4 v^.,4V

NOTARY PURUC
8HARRI3A 0. THORNTON
^ North Unlvtr *ty Av*,
Pr0V0, UT

* 4 * 03

**y Commission £xpin»f
A p r i | 11th< 1 9 9 5

STATE OP UTAH
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff,
910400220

vs
FARMERS INSURANCE
et al.,

EXCHANGE,

Defendants.

DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF
GREG DUVAL

TAKEN AT:

Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson,
50 South Main Street, Suite 700,
Salt Lake City, Utah

DATE:

October 19 & 23, 1992

REPORTED BY

Lesley Nelson, CSR

CENTER COURT REPORTING
203 Kress Building
40 South 100 West
Provo, Utah
84601
Telephone: (801) 373-4646

1

now further south than the front of the

2

Macarthur vehicle.

3

Q

By how much?

4

A

Several feet. However, I'm not sure how

5

far the Sprint pushed the truck westward nor how

6

much the collision force of the Jeep to the

7

Sentra had as far as pushing the Sentra either.

8

So they were fairly close proximity to eachother

9

after the rotation but before the subsequent

10

impacts.

11

dickering over a couple of feet here.

12
13
14

Q

They'd be fairly close.

The passenger side of the Woolstenhulme

truck and the front of the Macarthur vehicle?
A

We're talking just about a few feet

15

difference one way ot the other.

16

difference.

17

Q

18

opinion?
A

Yes.

20

Q

When was he hit?

21

A

One of two times.

22

MS. CLEGG:

23

THE WITNESS:

25

It's not a big

Has Brad Clark been hit yet, in your

19

24

We're

Excuse me.

One what?

One of two impacts.

I would say my primary guess is, is that he
exited the vehicle prior to the time that

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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1

Woolstenhulme hit the Macarthur vehicle.

2

already opened the door and stepped out.

3

He had

It's either the impact of the Woolstenhulme

4

truck into the Macarthur vehicle, either the

5

Macarthur vehicle struck him-- if he was

6

standing behind it and was knocked backwards, if

7

there's some angular issue-- or that the

8

Woolstenhulme truck could have hit him as he was

9

outside of the door, or he could be further

10

back. He doesn't know. But that would be the

11

impact of most significant

12

Macarthur vehicle was the one with the truck.

13

force to the

And then the other possibility is that the

14

Jeep of Hopkins could have pushed the car back

15

further after the Woolstenhulme

16

impact.

My primary guess is the Woolstenhulme

17

impact caused Brad to get hit by either

18

Macarthur's vehicle or Woolstenhulme's

19
20
21
22
23

Q

(BY MR. ZACCHEO)

truck.

Was that before or

after the Woolstenhulme truck hits Gilbert?
A

I would say that those two events

happened at nearly the same time.
We're going to split this down to some

24

hairs at this point, in that I think that

25

Macarthur was hit before Gilbert was hit.

And

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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1

driver's side of her vehicle-- because it had

2

spun around-- would be virtually right on that

3

yellow line; is that right?

41

A

That would be correct.

5

Q

And for Mr. Clark to exit the vehicle,

6

he would have had to have stepped onto the

7

travel portion of the roadway?

8

A

That's correct.

9

Q

Okay.

10
11

MR. JEFFS:
have.

12
13
14

That's all the questions I

EXAMINATION
BY MR. BELNAP:
Q

Mr. DuVal # without guessing or

15

speculating, would you be able to tell me what

16

the mechanism of injury was to Mr. Clark?

17

A

No.

18

Q

Without guessing or speculating, would

19

you be able to tell me the sequence and time at

20

which he sustained an injury?

21
22

A

From when he exited the vehicle to when

injury occurred?

23

Q

Yes.

24

A

No.

25

Q

And I guess it's a fair statement, is

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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1

it not, sir, that there's no further work that

21

you could do which would enable you to answer

3

that question?

41

A

I don't think that there is.

5

Q

Thank you.

61

(Whereupon, the deposition was concluded at

7

12:15 p.m.)
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*

*
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9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637
Attorney for Plaintiff
96 East 100 South
Provo, UT 84606-4603
Telephone: (801) 375-6092
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,

AFFIDAVIT OF GREG DUVAL

Plaintiff,
Civil No.

910400220

vs.
Judge:

Lynn W. Davis

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et
al
Defendant.
/
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Greg DuVal being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and

states as follows:

1.

That

I

am

an

accident

reconstructionist

hired

by

Plaintiff in the above entitled action.
2.

That my qualifications were previously set out in an

affidavit in opposition to Defendant MacArthur's motion for summary
judgment

herein

and

the

same

is

incorporated

herein

by

this

reference.
3.

That I have qualified

as an expert witness in every

division of the Fourth Judicial District Court.
4.

That I interviewed Rita Kennedy, and her information was

000034

helpful.

She did not provide temporal and spacial measurements

which she is capable of providing enabling us to determine with
relative certainty the exact mechanism of Brad Clark's injury.
5.

We have always maintained that it is impossible with the

information
Plaintiff's

available
injuries.

probabilities.

to

determine

the

exact

mechanism

of

The best we can do is to come up with

I feel the most probable mechanism of the injuries

was the sequence of crashes caused by the Woolstenhulme truck.
6.

The second most likely probability consists of the crash

sequence caused by the Colovich automobile.
7.

I can provide with virtual certainty that one or the

other of these events directly caused the collision with Plaintiff.
8.

All Defendants remaining in this case contributed in some

way to the crash events.
9.

That

the

factual

basis

upon

which

I

make

these

determinations are contained in my deposition and prior Affidavits
and attachments filed in this case, and I incorporate them herein
by this reference.
10.

I do not think it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to have

exited the MacArthur vehicle.

Plaintiff testified that Gilbert was

in trouble and asking for help.

The occupants of Plaintiff's car

were injured, by a collision with Woolstenhulme, while in the car.
The MacArthur car was not a place of relative safety.
2

000035

Wherefore further affiant saith naught.
DATED AND SIGNED this J_2_ day of April, 1993

Greg DuVal

?•

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

..-)- day of April,

1993.

J2fy

^

^NOTARY P^B^IC

„

^ Residing- a t : Prfri^ , ^ ' i
My commission Expires:

1

V*

\

••'..• f

• , iu-rrrij>.i;i

:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing
MOTIONS

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM

FOR

IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, postage

prepaid,

addressed

as

follows:
Aaron Alma Nelson
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
136 South Main Street, Suite 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Robert L. Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo Ut 84603

Richard K. Spratley
RICHARD K. SRRATLEY & ASSOC.
4021 South 700 East,
Woodland Towers, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Paul Belnap
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City Ut 84111

MICHAEL ZACCHEO
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
PO BOX 2465
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

D. RICHARD SMITH
MORRIES & MORRIS
424 EAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 1042
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

DATED AND SIGNED this _JV-\' day of April, 1993.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 05 THE KOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Civil No. 910400220
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is that right?
A That's just what I said, yes. Yes.
Q There's not just the beginning and the end of
the accident, but also between the time Colovich gets
there and Kennedy gets there or A Right.
Q Colovich and the truck?
A Right. There's just no way of knowing what
the time frames were between the events as they arrived
on the scene.
Q With regard to the vehicles that were present
at the accident, could you tell me the sequence in which
the vehicles arrived, who got there second and who got
there third?
A Yes, I believe so. I believe I can. Would
you like me to go through it?
Q Sure.
A Okay. Gilbert obviously is the initial
vehicle. Then Kennedy comes along and sees Gilbert,
swerves and hits the guardrail. And then apparently and now this was told to me, I did not read it, a
statement by Kennedy, but apparently she indicated that
she jumped the guardrail to get out of the way when she
saw the 18-wheeler truck coming along.
Q Now, when you say you had a conversation with

1
2
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4
5
6
7
8
9
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17
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20
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23
24
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I

Adamson or Colovich in the Buick is - the damage on the
front of the Buick and the back of the Jeep from that
collision is sufficient to have propelled the Jeep
forward with enough velocity to do what it did to Clark,
by throwing him over the guardrail.
Q And I take it at this point in time you don't
know the distance that Brad Clark was thrown over that
guardrail, whether he was one foot next to the guardrail
or 12 feet from the guardrail?
A That's correct, I don't have any information
on that at all.
Q And at this point in time you can't tell the
speeds of any of the vehicles; is that right?
A That's right, yes.
Q Did I hear you incorrectly earlier with regard
to the Holbrook vehicle? I thought earlier you told me
that you thought either Colovich or Holbrook was more
likely than Woolstenhulme, but now I'm hearing you narrow
it down to Colovich. I'm wondering if I'm hearing you
right or not.
A Well, I'm thinking in terms of vehicles, not
the drivers, and I told you that it was either the Buick
or the Cherokee that were most likely to have hit Q Okay.
A - Clark. And when you think about it, if

ROCKY MOUNTAIN Rr$)RTING SERVICE, INC.

her, is that A No. I'm saying that I have not even read her
witness statement, if she did so, if she made such a
statement Tm saying this was told to me by other
people. So all I'm going on is what I've been told and I
can't say this is the document where I learned this.
Q Okay.
A Okay. Then MacArthur was on the left side and
to the rear of the 18-wheeler and was cut off by the
18-wheeler, so she fishtails and spins and winds up
bouncing off the guardrail. Then Woolstenhulme comes
along, saw the semi cut off MacArthur and he hit - first
he hit Gilbert's car, then he runs into MacArthur's car.
Then Adamson comes along and hits the Jeep and is, in
turn, hit by Colovich. And when - as Colovich hits the
Jeep, that is, from our viewpoint, the most likely time
that Cark gets hit by the Jeep. And then Holbrook
comes along and slides into the side of the Woolstenhulme
truck, and that's the last car to be directly involved in
the pileup.
Q And on what facts do you base your
determination that Colovich or Holbrook are more likely
involved in the striking of Brad Clark than Adamson?
A Because Adamson comes along earlier and didn't
hit the Jeep hard enough to push the Jeep into Clark, but

1
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Cark had been hit first by the Buick before the Buick
hit the Cherokee, then it's likely that he would have
been pushed into the Cherokee and perhaps even crushed
between the - between the Buick and the Cherokee. So
that would make it more probable that it was the Cherokee
that hit him. But even that is not a solid conclusion.
It's based on the highest probability from the
information that's available.
Q Okay. Maybe - let me ask you, if I can put
this into layman's terms, so I know that I am
understanding you as well. Basically, you disagree with
Mr. Duvail in Duvail's opinion that it was more likely
Woolstenhulme, right?
A The Cherokee?
Q Woolstenhulme is the pickup truck.
A I see, I see what you're saying. I
misunderstood you. I don't think it could have been
Woolstenhulme because he was too far out in the road. It
would have required a much greater angle of impact for
him to have bumped Qark and caused Qark to fly over the
guardrail. Because, as I said earlier, a vehicle
traveling in one direction has a very difficult time
hitting something and knocking it in any direction but
the direction the vehicle is traveling,
Q Okay. So you think it is more likely that it

ROCKY MOUNTAIN RE^RTING SERVICE, INC.
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is either Adamson in the Jeep or Colovich in the Buick;
is that right?
A Yes.
Q But as you sit here today, you don't know
which; is that right?
A I'd say the higher probability is the Jeep,
but Vm not certain. I can't say for sure.
Q And I take it that you can't say for sure that
it wasn't - well, other than the MacArthur vehicle in
which Brad Clark was actually riding, we know it wasn't
him or anything that got to the accident before that car?
A Yes.
Q We do know that for certain?
A Yes, that is very logical.
Q And then would it be true that after the
MacArthur vehicle, you don't know for certain of any of
the following vehicles?
A Well, yeah, not for certain, but let's face
it, we have the Jeep and the Buick parked on the east
side of the road. And if any of the other vehicles that
came through had hit Clark, it would have been the same
kind of phenomena that it would have been necessary to
occur had Woolstenhulme been the one to have hit Clark.
They all had to be much farther, at least 10 feet west of
the guardrail as they went by, because they couldn't have
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went wrong, either his driving ability, his speed, or
something went wrong because he went into a spin and
wound up crosswise in the number 2 lane in the right side
emergency lane and came to a stop. I mean, that has to
be a share of fault in starting the chain of events, but
certainly not the entire fault.
Q (BY MR. PETERSEN) And could you tell me, can
you list anything in particular that you believe Gilbert
did or didn't do which he should have done or should not
have done?
A Failed to maintain control of his car.
Q Anything else?
A I don't have any more information than that.
Q How about Kennedy?
A I don't have any information about the
distance between Kennedy and Gilbert as they traveled on
the road before they got to the accident location, so I
can't say that Kennedy was following too close. I can't
say that Kennedy was going too fast. It's apparent that
Kennedy didn't see Gilbert early enough to be able to
steer around him without losing control. Therefore, it
follows that Kennedy either was non-observant or was
going too fast, or both.
Q Did the presence of the Kennedy vehicle after
it came to rest present any sort of problem in

ROCKY MOUNTAIN R E N T I N G SERVICE, INC.

gone through the Jeep or the Buick, so that just becomes
a law of deduction.
Q Okay. And if the speeds of the following
vehicles are greater, theoretically they can propel Brad
Clark's body farther, is that right?
A Correct Except they would have not propelled
him to the left, they would have propelled him straight
down the road and he would have landed in the middle of
the road farther down the highway rather than off to the
side as he did At least, as I understand he did.
Q Do you have any opinion with regard to any
vehicle coming after Holbrook?
A As to what?
Q As to any participation in the accident.
A I don't know whether other vehicles came
through the area or not that were not involved in the
accident and, therefore, were not recorded.
Q I'd like to take each of these people in turn
and ask you if you have any opinions with regard to their
actions or omissions. First, Gilbert, do you have any
opinions with regard to Gilbert?
MR.ZACCHEO: You're asking about faults?
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
MR. PETERSEN: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Thank you. Obviously, something
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maneuvering of the vehicles that came afterwards?
A Not nearly as much as Gilbert, but certainly
the presence of a car there creates a hazard and
something to be aware of.
Q Are you aware of any other fault where the
acts or omissions on the part of Gilbert MR. JEFFS: Gilbert or Kennedy?
MR. PETERSEN: Tm sorry. Gilbert Thank
you.
THE WITNESS: I don't have enough information
to be able to say.
Q (BY MR. PETERSEN) How about with regard to
the 18-wheeler?
A Well, I described the decision-making process
of the 18-wheeler and it appears that the driver can be
credited with being wise in not running into Gilbert and
opting to cause MacArthur more problems. Beyond that, he
managed to get his rig through the accident location
without contacting anything, so the fact that he did what
he did would indicate that if he was able to do it,
others should have been able to do it, also.
Q Am I to take from that that you do not
attribute any fault to the semi truck?
A No, no, that's not correct I would say that,
once again, with the weather conditions what they were,
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